S p i r i t ua l i t y S t u d i e s 5 - 2 Fa l l 2 0 1 9 1 9 Other to “the same”. Cogito (En. “I think”) finally means “I can” and appropriation of the other, power transformation of the becoming a notion. Conceptualization means suppression the horizon of things where they are lost and shown, caught, what betrays them in the horizon of “being at all” (Sein), in istent (Seiende) in what they are not existent – alien here, immorality. By neutralization of the other, I catch the ex- Transfer of the Other to “the same” is then the essence of questioning of my spontaneity, as ethics” (Lévinas 1997c, 28). irreducibility to Me, my ideas and my possession – occurs as presence of the Other. “The strangeness of the Other – their means questioning spontaneous egoism of “the same” by the who is the existent. ontology is not primal, ethics is. Ethics of the existent (Ger. Seiende), but the relationship to someone primal, but a unique relationship is, not the being (Ger. Sein) depth of a night (Lévinas 1997b, 47 and further on) are not him, on the contrary, the shapeless teeming, the anonymous we as subjects would suddenly find ourselves. According to being was a primal state, a gift of the vicious world in which nas shows that such a fatal fate would impend man if that tion, slavery of the “teeming” totality of being (there is)? Lévi- Other to “the same” condemns our existence to eternal isola- us into solitary confinement? That non-transferability of the Does it mean that radical separateness of the Other can cast unselfishness of goodness” (Lévinas 1997a, 21). metaphysical desire for the absolutely Other “presupposes ence of the noble, the highest, the infinite, the invisible. The unicity of each Thou. The difference of the Other is the differ- between us, since it reveals authentic exteriority, difference, of this existential desire paradoxically increases the distance ther. It is a desire for the radically heterogeneous. Realization transcends every fulfilment and deepens the desire itself fur- then it is not real love. Real love longs for something that If we talk about love as of saturation of some noble hunger, completely different, something we have never contained. physical desire does not crave for a return, but for something in advance (the other as an alter ego). However, the meta- tentially nostalgic for something they at least partially know lacks something, i.e. they are incomplete, thus, they are exis- on a need, since a need is a state in which a human person (Lévinas 1997a, 19). The desire for the Other is not based toward something completely different, absolutely different” in, like sometimes I am for myself…Metaphysical desire heads is not ‘other’ like the bread I eat, place I live in, country I dwell meaning of the word. “The Other we metaphysically crave for, where”, outside one’s Self, into terra incognita in the strongest active movement to the other suggests a movement “else- to the familiar, obvious, own country dominated by me. An an “alien”, to something and someone that does not belong and impersonality. When we turn to the other, we turn to y a) that covers everything with its non-differentiatedness entire, anonymous, total and general being (there is, Fr., il existence needs to be differentiated from “the same”, the Lévinas understood that in identification of the other, their than “I” and at the same time, different to everything else. goodwill? Who is the other? The other is above all different Who is a friend, a neighbor, the other, to whom “I” turn my sibility. by the nature of unity, generosity, respect and mutual respon- a starting point for all positive social relationships, marked “I and Thou” is an operative symbol, an effective sign and unique story of friendship. The basic relationship between one, a specific “Thou”, with whom “I” develop a deep and its origins in an elementary relation to the Other, the close this quality of co-existence with others in a community has is a cultural condition for the pursuit of a good life. However, broader co-existence, in which respect for the other person for a person” (Arendt, 2007, 316). Civic friendship is a virtue of imity and intimacy. This relationship is an expression of respect politiké’, a sort of ‘political friendship’ that does not require prox- best described as ‘respect’. Respect is like the Aristotelian ‘philía man affairs corresponds to a personal relationship that may be derstanding of friendship: “Love in the broader sphere of hu- A quotation by Hannah Arendt aptly illustrates Aristotle’s un- cused on. Particularly, the ethical conception of Emanuel Lévinas is fo- penetrates moral attitude of the acting subject, is ultimate. the moment of transcendence of the other (Thou), which moral character education (Brestovanský 2019). For my study, are followed by programs of prosocial moral education or is constituted in a relation to the others. These conceptions tue ethics and ethics of care), for which holds that moral virtue of “good life” (Aristotle, representatives of contemporary vir- perspective crucial for communicative action, but also ethics Derrida, Paul Ricoeur and others), which consider the moral nas, Martin Buber, Jürgen Habermas, Karl otto Apel, Jacques dialogue, communication and social bonds (Emmanuel Lévi- set of ethics of the “second person” includes philosophies of action and it is a challenge so that “I” “care for them”. The my moral responsibility. Being of the other precedes my own “I”, is a permanent source of my disturbance and appeal to tum of moral action. The other –“Thou”, standing face to face considers the relationship to the Other for the crucial momen- ception and a theory of ethical education based on it, which The “second-person ethics” (Thou–ethics) is an ethical con- 5 The Second-Person Ethics AnDREJ RAJSKý
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